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WHEN A LIBEL IS NOT A LIBEL
The frequently repeated saying that "the greater the truth the
greater the libel," only related to criminal trials, and was meant
to apply only to the charge made-thus, a charge of murder or
treason was greater than a charge of robbery or a lesser offense.
The truth was not a defense in criminal proceedings in England
until 1847. In America it is a constitutional provision that the
truth shall be a defense to libel in all cases.
In civil actions for damages the truth has always been a defense
in England and in America.
There is no branch of the law that is generally as little under-
stood and incapable of being defined by statute as is that of
libel; yet it is the most frequent'of application and as much in use
for the good or ill of an individual or a community at large as any
one of our constitutional liberties.
The bill of rights found in the constitution of each State pro-
vides "that every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that
right."
Thus the publisher as well as the accused, is protected from an
abuse of the right. Actions for damages by individuals are
resorted to for revenge as well as for profit. In such actions the
burden of proof is on the defendant, who must prove his excuse
for the publication and must show that it was made without
malice. Thus he is always placed at a disadvantage before a
jury. It is this disadvantage that exercises a principal restraint
against the abuse of the press. The small recovery of damages
is a protection to the press for trivial libels, while heavy damages
are a penalty for a vicious and malicious publication.
The common law of England relating to libel and slander pre-
vailed in America in civil actions for damages until about sixty
years ago, when the new system of procedure in civil actions be-
came popular, and extensively adopted. But the common law
has undergone little change or improvement in England or
America in other respects. It has never been defined in civil
actions. No part of the law has undergone less change in the
last two centuries than that relating to libel and slander.
The common law still prevails generally, with slight changes
relating to procedure. It is founded on the wants and needs of
the community, and is to enforce libel and slander suits as known
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to the common law of England. It is intended for the enforce-
ment and protection of rights, and for the protection and redress
of wrongs.
Libel is mainly defined by judicial decisions; in criminal law
and also in civil actions. In the codification of the criminal penal
law in New York State, the definition of libel as recognized by
the common law is defined as follows: "A malicious publication
by writing, printing, picture, effigy, sign or otherwise than by
mere speech, which exposes any living person, or the memory of
any person deceased, to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or
which causes, or tends to cause any person to be shunned or
avoided, or which has a tendency to injure any person, corpora-
tion, or association of persons, in his or their business or occupa-
tion, is a libel.1
A publication having the effect or tendency mentioned is to be
deemed (i) malicious, if no justification or excuse therefor i-
shown; (2) justified, when the matter charged as. libelous is true,
and was published with good motives and fori justifiable ends;
(3) excused' when it is honestly made in the belief of its truth
and upon reasonable grounds for this belief, and consists of fair
comments upon the conduct of a person in respect to public
affairs, or upon a thing which the proprietor thereof offers or
explains to the public.2
A communication made to a person entitled to or interested in
the communication by one who was also interested in or entitled
to make it, or who stood in such relation to the former as to afford
a reasonable ground for supposing his motive innocent, is pre-
sumed under the codes not to be malicious, and is called a privi-
leged communication.3
There are privileged publications that are allowed or excused
in several instances.
An action, civil or criminal, cannot be maintained against a
reporter, editor, publisher, or proprietor of a newspaper, for the
publication therein of a fair and true report of any judicial, legis-
lative, or other public and official proceedings, without proving
actual malice in making the report. This does not apply to the
I Penal Code, Sect. 242-51340. (It is substantially the same in every
State, malice being presumed prima facie by the publication).
2This is merely a codification of the common law in civil and criminal
cases.
s This is a fair codification of the common law relating to privileged
commtinications.
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libel contained in the heading of the report; or in any other 
mat-
ter added by any person concerned in the publication; or 
in the
report of anything said or done at the time and place of the pub-
lic and official proceedings which was not a part thereof. 
The
publication on its face must show the exemption. A fair 
state-
ment of judicial proceeding is all that is allowed. It must 
not be
garbled so as to produce misrepresentations, or by suppression 
of
some portion of the evidence or proceedings to have the 
effect of
giving a false or unjust impression, to the prejudice of the 
parties
concerned. It need not be repeated verbatim, or embrace 
the




Such matter is an absolute privilege, without regard 
to the
truth of the matter. If it depended upon the truth, the 
privilege
would be of no avail. The truth itself is an absolute defense 
and
bar to a civil action in all cases without regard to the 
question of
malice.5
Where the words complained of as libelous are ambiguous and
the complaint contains no innuendo which would make 
them
libelous, it fails to state a cause of action.
6 The libelous article
must be capable of a certain application to the plaintiff, and 
may
be shown by innuendoes in the pleading.
When a libel relates to one of several persons but does not
specify to which, such persons cannot, by prosecuting an action
for damages, put the defendants upon their defense and compel
them to disclose to whom the libel referred.'
To impute to a professional man ignorance or want of skill in
a particular transaction is not actionable without proving actual
damage. To be actionable words of that character must be
spoken or written of him generally.
8
The class of publications, as well as the occasion and objects
that render persons publishing them exempt from criminal lia-
bility, is all important in considering the liberty guaranteed to
every citizen by the bill of rights, to publish his sentiments on all
subjects, and be responsible for the abuse of that right. The
abuse of the right is what the penal and the civil codes and the
courts must be invoked to protect. The language of the courts
4Salisbury v. Union Adv. Co., 45 Hun., 120.
5 Ackerman v. Jones, 37 N. Y. Sup. Ct, 42.
6 Outcault v. Herald, 1i7 App. Div. (N. Y.), 534:
7Girard v. Beach, 3 E. 0. Smith (N..Y.), 337.
8 Garr v. Selden, 6 Barb. (N. Y.), 416.
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defining libel is very broad, but the exceptions allowed make its
enforcement very complicated and frequently resorted to.
The basis of all civil actions is the claim for damages. There
are three kinds of damages, actual, punitive and exemplary. They
may all be sought and recovered in one action. The first must be
alleged and proved the same as any other claim. Punitive
damages are to punish the publisher, and exemplary damages are
to warn him and others not to do likewise without danger of pay-
ing heavy damages.
*The penal'laws for criminal libel, which make it a misdemeanor,
are seldom resorted to by parties claiming to be libeled; but
personal libel suits for damages are now very frequent, hence the
importance of knowing what kind of a publication makes the
publisher liable for damages. He may be liable to a criminal
prosecution, -although not liable for damages in a civil action.
The most frequent publications complained of are those charg-
ing some crime, or misfeasance and malfeasance in office. These
charges may be justified under the provisions of law applicable to
the circumstances, which a'jury may pass upon. Direct charges
that the court will hold as a libel on its face without any extrinsic
allegations are designated as libel per se. Where the crime
charged is a misdemeanor it may not be a libel per se. Where the
words, if true, would subject the plaintiff to an indictment, they
are libelous. If they fall short of this test, they are not actionable
unless special damage is alleged.
A misdemeanor is ordinarily not punishable by an infamous
punishment; hence, in order that a charge of such offense may be
-actionable per se, it is necessary that it be indictable and involve
moral turpitude. A charge of petit larcency is not a libel if false,
unless it is a misdemeanor under the penal code.
Chancellor Kent said in Store v. Cooper 9: "To sustain a private
action for the recovery of a private compensation in damages for
a false and unauthorized publication, the plaintiff in such action
must either aver and prove that he has sustained some special
damage from the publication of the matier charged against him;
or the nature of the charge itself must be such that the court can
legally presume he has been degraded in the estimation of his
acquaintances or of the public, or has suffered some other loss
either in his property, character or business, or in his domestic or
social relations in consequence of the publication of such charge.
9 2 Denio, 298.
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The provisions of the penal code should be considered to 
the
full extent of their importance in civil actions for damages. As 
a
general rule, a publication that the penal code allows or does 
not
prohibit, cannot be made the basis of an action for damages with-
out alleging and proving actual damages.
In all civil actions the question of libel or no libel, where 
it
arises solely on the face of the publication, is a question 
of law
for the court. The jury is bound to follow the instructions 
of the
court in those cases.
There is one exception to the general rule of pleading 
and
proof of special damage' it is that when the words impute
unchastity to a woman actual damage and malice are presumed.
Criticism differs from defamation. It deals only with such
things as invite public attention or call for public comment. 
It
never attacks the individual, but only his work. Such work 
may
be either the policy of the government, the action of a 
public
officer, a public entertainment, a book published or a work of 
art
exhibited. The comment must not go beyond the fair discussion
of matters of public interest, and the judicious guidance of 
the
public taste. The statement upon which the opinion is founded
must be fair and true, and the opinion honestly expressed. 
The
court must decide whether the matter commented on is one of
public interest. If the court is of the opinion that there is some
evidence that the statement is untrue or unfiir, the jury must
decide the case.10
It is said in Gott v. Pulsifer 11 that "The editor of a newspaper
has the right, if not the duty, of publishing for the information
of the public, fair and reasonable comments, however severe 
in
terms, upon anything which is made by its owner a subject 
of
public exhibition, as upon any other matter of public interest; and
such a publication falls within the class of public communications
for which no action can be maintained without proof of actual
malice."
Chief Justice Cockburn said :12 "I think the fair position 
in
which the law can be settled is this: That where the public con-
duct of a public man is open to an animadversion and the writer
who is commenting upon it makes imputations on his motives
which arise fairly and legitimately out of his conduct, so that the
jury shall say that the criticism was not only honest but also 
well
10 South Hetton Coal Co. v. N. E. News Assn. (i894), 2 Q. B., i4o.
11 12 Mass., 235.
12 Campbell v. Spottiswoode, 3 B. & S., 776.
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founded, an action is not maintainable. But it is not because a
public writer fancies that the conduct of a public man is open to
the suspicion of dishonesty, he is therefore justified in assailing
his character as dishonest."
A criticism denouncing plaintiff's work in the "Round Table"
as "one of the worst stories that had been printed since Sterne,
Fielding and Smollet defiled the literature of the already foul
eighteenth century," that it "is not only tainted with this one foul
spot, it is replete with impurity; it reeks with allusions that the
most prurient scandal monger would hestitate to make," is a libel
for a jury to determine. In this case, after a lengthy trial in New
York City and able charge, the jury rendered a verdict of six
cents damages.1 s The plaintiff alleged that he was greatly pre-
judiced in his credit and reputation as an author, and brought
into public scandal, infamy and disgrace by the articles published
in the "Round Table" by the defendant, criticising a book which
had been published in America, on which the plaintiff was being
paid a royalty. The "Round Table" was regarded by the literary
world as of high standing. In charging the jury, the court (Mr.
Justice Clark) said: "The most comprehensive freedom in ani-
madverting upon the productions and actions of public men is es-
sential to the very existence of civil and political liberty, and to the
progress of civilization, and I heartily say-with Lord Ellen-
borough, in Zobart v. Zipper,4 Liberty of criticism must be
allowed, or we should have neither purity of taste-nor of morals.
Fair discussion is essentially necessary to the truth of history and
the advancement of science. That publication therefore I shall
never consider libel which has for its object, not to injure the
reputation of any individual, but to correct misapprehension of
fact, to repute sophistical reasoning, to expose a vicious taste in
literature, or to censure what is hostile to morality."
In McAvoy v. Press Pub. Co.,' the court said: "The defendant
attempts to justify by claiming that as a matter of law the plain-
tiff was unfit to take or hold the office because he was a member
of a political club, association, society and committee, and that
this fact itself discredited him in the holding of the office. If
this claim be well founded, then the article was not objectionable.
because if as a matter of fact and law an officer is unfit to hold the
office, a newspaper, no less than an individual, has the right to say
Is Reade v. Sweetzer, 6 Abb., Pr. 9.
14 1 Campbell, 350.
13 114 App. Div. (N. Y.), 543.
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so. Every citizen has the right to discuss the public acts of-
public men. and the legal qualificatic.n for office is a matter of
concern to every citizen."
The distinction between an article censuring or satirizing an
entire class or body of individuals, and one which aims defama-
tory statements at an individual, is well settled. The former may
not be made the basis of an action for individual damages, the
latter may.1 6
A municipal corporation cannot sue for libel, and an action
does not lie by an officer of a regiment of militia for a publication
reflecting on the officers of the regiment generally, without aver-
ring ja special damage.17
In Dooling v. Budget Pub. Co.,"8 the court held that words
relating merely to the quality of the article made, produced,
furnished, or sold by a person, if false and malicious, are not
actionable without special damage. To allege that an article of
food contains benzoate of soda and is poisonous is not libelous,
but a mere criticism, as it shows what the opinion is based on.
Others might have a contrary opinion on the same state of facts.
The liberty of the press to honestly comment on and expose
official misconduct exists in something more than name, and is
not to be throttled, by threats or suits in the form of claims for
damages instituted against publishers who call attention to such
defaults and voice the public cry. Personal libel suits are now
frequently resorted to by public officers for the purpose of in-
timidation, because the penal code will not meet their require-
-inents. These public officers do not care to have the discussion or
the criticism of their public matters by the press in the hands of -a
criminal court and jury.
Judge Cooley in his work on constitutional limitations says:
"The newspaper press has become one of the chief necessities of
our alert and commercial civilization. It .bears its official rela-
tions to the government, national, State and local, and it comes
nearer to the popular eye and heart than any other agency for in-
fluencing public opinion. In the main it iecognizes the impor-
tance of these relations which have grown up between it and the
communities it serves, and discharges the functions assigned it
26 184 Ct. of Appeals 4 83-approving Ryckman v. Delavan, 25 Wen-
dell, 186.
17 Sumner v. Bud, 12 John, 475.
28 144 Mass., 258.
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with a dignity, sagacity, intelligence and enterprise not surpassed
by laborers in other fields. It is a fact that the general disposition
of juries in such cases, where the malice is a legal fiction and not a
natural fact, is to deal leniently with the defendants. Verdicts of
six cents damages are of common occurence. The significance
of these verdicts is, that while the publisher has been guilty of a
technical libel, his guilt was done in innocence and the plaintiff
is not entitled to smart money."
The first article of the amendments to the Constitution provides
that "Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press."
The law on this point is the same in England as it is in America.
It was said by Baron Parke that "Every subject has a right to
comment on those acts of public men which concern him as a
subject of the realm, if he does not make his. commentary a cloak
for malice and slander."
Chief Justice Cockburn said: "Those who fill a public position
must not be too thin-skinned in reference- to comments made upon
them. It 'vould often happen that observations could be made
upon public men which they knew from the bottom of their hearts
were undeserved and unjust; yet they must bear with them and
submit to be misunderstood for a time because all knew that the
criticism of the press was the best security for the proper .dis-
charge of public duties."
Lord Brougham said: "The best security for a government
like ours (a free government) and generally for the public peace
and public morals, is that the whole community should be well
.informed upon its political as well as its other interests. And it
can be well informed only by having access to wholesome, sound,
and impartial publications."
Congress has never attempted to make any laws to abridge the
freedom of speech or of the press.
Roscellus S. Guernscv.
New York City.
